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Blankley: The Future of Arbitration Law?

THE FUTURE OF ARBITRATION LAW?
By Kristen M. Blankley*
ABSTRACT
This Article provides an in-depth statistical analysis of statutory interpretation of the
Supreme Court’s arbitration docket. This paper follows my work in Standing on Its Own
Shoulders: The Supreme Court’s Statutory Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act. By
looking at how the Court interprets the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), this paper makes
predictions about how arbitration cases might be resolved in the future. This paper considers
the reliance on and use of fourteen tools of statutory interpretation over the Court’s 52 cases
and 114 separate opinions interpreting the FAA through the end of 2021. By considering four
crucial sub-categories of cases, this paper draws trends and comparisons across different
arbitration legal theories. Specifically, this paper analyzes class arbitration cases, preemption
cases, arbitrability cases, and cases involving a potential conflict between the FAA and other
federal law. This paper draws four primary conclusions. First, the class action cases will
likely continue to build off of themselves, by relying on past precedent and the arbitration
canon. Second, the Court will likely continue to give the FAA broad preemptive power given
not only its broad support across the Court but also because of an interesting “Thomas Effect”
in which Justice Thomas votes against his own prior opinions to maintain a conservative
majority. Third, the arbitrability cases stand as a microcosm of the entire arbitration docket,
even though they do not contain any strong trends unique to such cases. Finally, this paper
draws the conclusion that the Court treats the FAA as a super-statute, giving it gravitational
pull over other statutes that might conflict with it.
INTRODUCTION
As the saying goes, the best predictor of the future is the past. In the legal realm, this
maxim is bolstered by the principle of stare decisis, and trends within areas of law can be seen
and often predicted. Legal scholars, pundits, and journalists predict the holdings of key
Supreme Court cases based on political leanings, prior precedent, and intuition. Arbitration
scholars, too, engage in similar predictions based on these factors. And while few Supreme
Court cases actually surprise those who watch the dockets carefully, some legal scholars are
beginning to use data analysis to describe trends supported by data – including trends in
statutory interpretation and voting patterns by justices.1
*

Kristen M. Blankley, Henry M. Grether, Jr., Professor of Law. Thanks to my research assistant Emma
Kalkowski-Ferrand for her help. Special thanks to the University of Nebraska Social and Behavioral Sciences
Research Consortium, particularly Alian Kasabian, Lisa PytlikZillig, and Jay Jeffries, for providing the
statistical analysis displayed in this paper. Thanks to the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution at Pepperdine
University Caruso School of Law for allowing me to workshop this paper at the AALS Section of Dispute
Resolution Works in Progress Conference.
1
See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2009)
(conducting analysis, including individual justice-level trends); Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and
Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court’s First Decade, 117
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Following the trends of empirical research in statutory interpretation by the Supreme
Court by other scholars,2 I coded and analyzed every opinion by the Court interpreting the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). In my first paper based on this analysis, Standing on Its Own
Shoulders: The Supreme Court’s Statutory Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act,3 I
compared general trends in statutory interpretation as reported by other scholars with the
trends that emerged in my arbitration-specific dataset.4 In the arbitration context, the Court
overrelies on judge-made law, including prior arbitration precedent and the arbitration canon,
when compared to other scholar’s similar analyses in other areas.5
While the first paper in this series considered general trends comparing FAA
precedent with other Supreme Court precedent, this article looks at trends within arbitration
law and considers the future of arbitration. This paper moves beyond the global comparatives
and digs into important questions within arbitration law. Specifically, this paper considers
trends within the arbitration case docket itself relating to class action, preemption, and
arbitrability cases.
In the present in-depth analysis, I discovered a number of interesting trends. First,
the class action docket and the preemption docket used similar tools of statutory
interpretation, despite the fact that those two sets of cases have little overlap. Both of those
sets of cases involved high reliance on the text of the FAA, prior FAA cases, and reliance on
the arbitration canon. The preemption cases also uncover an interesting trend in Justice
Thomas’ voting pattern, which I call the “Thomas Effect.” Second, the arbitrability cases are
an interesting microcosm because the use of tools of statutory interpretation mirrored almost
identically the whole of the arbitration docket. And third, the patterns uncovered in the line of
cases in which the FAA arguably conflicts with other federal law demonstrated that the FAA
is being interpreted as a super-statute.
This article proceeds in five parts. First, this article provides critical background into
my first study with the purpose of providing useful background information. The second part
analyzes the impact of the Supreme Court’s choice of tools of interpretation within the
arbitration class action docket, and the implications for future class action arbitration cases.
The third part looks specifically at the Court’s FAA preemption cases, as they relate to nonpreemption and other types of FAA cases. In the fourth part, this article analyses the
arbitrability docket – the cases in which the Court decided whether a court or arbitrator makes
MICH. L. REV. 71 (2018) (analyzing canon use in the Roberts’ Court); Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory
Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empirical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221
(2010) (analyzing first five years of the Roberts’ Court); David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology:
The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653 (2010) (conducting
analysis focusing on legislative history use).
2
See, e.g., Anita Krishnakumar, Backdoor Purposivism, 69 DUKE L.J. 1275, 1292 (2020) (analyzing the
Roberts Court’s use of purposivist tools); Anita Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2016)
(reviewing canon use and overall trends of the Roberts Court); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp
and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law,
58 DUKE L.J. 1231 (2009) (conducting statutory analysis and comparing approaches in workplace and tax law);
James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005) (analyzing Supreme Court use of canons in the area of labor and employment).
3
Kristen M. Blankley, Standing On Its Own Shoulders: The Supreme Court’s Statutory Interpretation of the
Federal Arbitration Act, 55 AKRON L. REV. 101 (2022).
4
See generally id.
5
Id. at 103.
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certain decisions regarding the viability of the underlying case.6. The fifth part considers the
tools used to determine whether a claim arising under federal law is subject to an arbitration
agreement – a category of cases I refer to as “conflicts” of federal law.7 At the end of each
part, I predict the future of each category of cases, assuming that Congress adopts no radical
changes to the FAA.8
I.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH

When I originally undertook this project, I followed in the footsteps of scholars
before me, particularly Professors James Brudney and Professor Anita Krisnakumar.9 My
dataset includes 52 cases decided by the Supreme Court interpreting the FAA through the end
of 2021. These cases span from 1938 to 2019. The 52 cases involve 114 separate opinions:
fifty majority or per curium opinions; forty-three dissenting opinions; one plurality opinion;
and twenty concurring opinions.10 For each opinion, I recorded basic information, such as the
case name, year, opinion type (majority, dissent, etc.), author, and number of signatories to
the opinion.11 I also noted whether the case involved a question relating to class actions.12
As I created the database, I captured some arbitration-related data particularly
relevant to the analysis in this paper. I divided the cases into six different arbitration-specific
categories: 1) preemption, 2) arbitrability, 3) jurisdiction, 4) award review, 5) conflicting
federal statutes, and 6) other.13 As discussed in more detail below, I separately coded cases
dealing with arbitrability due to a contract defense, arising out of the Prima Paint14 line of
cases, and those cases considering whether a federal statute precludes arbitration of the
underlying claim, arising out of the Wilko v. Swan15 line of cases. In this second category of
cases, I only coded the tools of interpretation used to interpret the FAA, and not the tools used
to interpret the other federal statute at issue (i.e., the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
in Gilmer16 or the Federal Labor Relations Act in Epic Systems17). I also captured the exact
section of the FAA the Court interpreted, but analyzing the cases across these six categories

6

See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002) (defining a “question of arbitrability” as
the “question whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration”).
7
Kristen M. Blankley, Creating a Framework for Examining Federal Agency Rules Impacting Arbitration, 63
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 9, 16–26 (2020) (outlining the historical and current treatment of conflicts of federal
law with the FAA and the resolution of such conflicts).
8
In March 2022, Congress enacted the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment
Act, prohibiting the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and class action waivers for claims
involving sexual harassment and sexual assault. 9 U.S.C. §§ 401−02. Given the limited scope of the new law, I
do not anticipate it changing my predictions in each of the parts.
9
Professors James and Krishnakumar are mentioned in supra note 2.
10
Blankley, supra note 3, at 116. Later in this paper, the category of “concurring” opinions includes all
opinions other than majority opinions, dissenting opinions, and per curium opinions.
11
Id. at 117.
12
Id.
13
Id. (Codebook list of arbitration categories).
14
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
15
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
16
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
17
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1616 (2017).

53
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship
Repository,

3

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2022, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

THE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
proved more useful than across specific sections (i.e., cases interpreting §2’s general mandate
or the §4 authority to compel arbitration).
I coded for thirteen primary interpretive tools, including the text, the whole act rule,
prior precedent (both arbitration precedent and non-arbitration precedent), three categories of
canons, legislative history (and a breakdown thereof), legislative inaction, intent, and
purpose.18 I chose these particular categories to pattern my work on previous work by
Professors Brudney and Krishakumar to facilitate drawing comparisons with other statutory
interpretation literature.19 Rather than consider only the presence or absence of the use of a
tool, I used a slightly more granular scale to capture one of the following: 1) reliance on a
tool, 2) citation or rejection of a tool without reliance, and 3) absence of any discussion of the
tool.20
My first study drew conclusions by comparing my arbitration data with the data
previously collected by other scholars. Specifically, I concluded in the first study that –
compared to work done by other scholars – the Supreme Court relied more on itself when
interpreting the FAA than it does when interpreting other statutes.21 I drew this conclusion by
comparing rates of reliance on prior Supreme Court precedent within the FAA dataset
compared to other scholars’ reported data. My research broke down reliance on prior FAA
cases compared to other Supreme Court cases from other areas of the law (such as civil
procedure or labor arbitration), and my research showed that within the FAA docket, the
Supreme Court relies more on FAA prior precedent compared to other studies that did not
distinguish between cases that might or might not have stare decisis effect.22 This conclusion
was bolstered when looking specifically at substantive canon use. I separated out reliance on
the arbitration canon from reliance on other canons (such as those relating to the doctrine
against implied repeal or reading statutes together harmonious), and my findings showed that
the Supreme Court had a higher rate of reliance on the arbitration canon alone compared to
other scholars’ work documenting reliance on all substantive canons combined.23 Given these
factors, unsurprisingly, my data showed an overreliance on the text compared to studies of
statutory interpretation.24 Taken together, these findings show that the Supreme Court has
looked to itself to interpret the FAA in a way that appears to be unique.
This paper, then, explores trends within the arbitration dataset. The remaining
sections consider issues related to important areas of arbitration law, including issues
involving class action, preemption, arbitrability, and conflicts between federal statutes. Each
of those areas is addressed in turn.
II.

CLASS ACTION FINDINGS

Arbitration cases involving class action issues are the most divisive portion of the
Court’s docket. These cases often result in fractured opinions with slim majorities, similar to
18

Blankley, supra note 3, at 122.
See supra note 7.
20
Blankley, supra note 3, at 151 (detailing the methods used to ensure accuracy and consistency of coding
across cases).
21
Id. at 103.
22
Id. at 125.
23
Id. at 102.
24
Id. at 103.
19
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cases involving litigation class actions.25 In addition, these cases show high reliance on both
textual tools (text, prior precedent, canons) and purposivist tools (intent, purpose). Of all of
the Court’s arbitration cases, the cases involving class action appear to be the most outcome
oriented, focusing on business interests to the exclusion of the interests of consumers,
employees, and other potential claimants.
The class action docket poses interpretive challenges for the Court because the FAA
does not address the issue. Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, prior to the promulgation of
the modern Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.26 Congress, however, has not re-visited the FAA
to address class action issues, and without a statutory basis, the Court has forged its way
utilizing different lines of lines of reasoning to support different cases. In 2022, Congress
amended the FAA to prohibit the enforcement of pre-dispute class action waivers in the
limited context of cases involving sexual assault and sexual harassment.27 Congress did not
add any additional language to address the availability of class actions in any other arbitration
context.
Without an independent textual basis for class action rulings, the Court applies legal
reasoning from the six categories of arbitration cases. For instance, Green Tree v. Bazzle,28
the first case that delved into class action issues,29 fell within the arbitrability line of
reasoning.30 Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds31 turned on legal issues regarding the scope of
review of arbitration awards,32 and Epic Systems v. Lewis33 grappled with the issue of whether
claims falling under the Fair Labor Standards Act required a judicial forum.34 Yet, despite the
varying legal theories underlying the cases, this section details some commonalities in
statutory interpretation when cases involve a class action.
This section considers the fourteen unique cases in which Court interpreted the FAA
when the underlying case involves a class action. These fourteen cases involve forty-four
separate opinions, or an average of more than three opinions in each case. For perspective,
non-class action arbitration cases generate slightly less than two opinions per case.35 The
cases fell within the following subject-matter categories: 1) seven arbitrability cases, 2) three
25

See, e.g., TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2190 (2021) (delivering a 5-4 decision with three
separate opinions on the issue of standing to assert the class action); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27,
27 (2013) (5-4 decision on the issue of class certification); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 338
(2011) (involving a majority opinion that was partially unanimous with part of the decision resulting in a 5-4
split opinion).
26
The first modern version of Rule 23 became effective in 1966. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s
note to 1937 amendment. Prior to this rule, class procedures were governed under rules of equity, including
Equity Rule 38, under the original 1937 Rules. See id.
27
9 U.S.C. § 402 (prohibiting the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and pre-dispute joint
action waivers in cases of sexual assault and sexual harassment).
28
Green Tree v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 444 (2003).
29
Coincidentally, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), and Green
Tree Fin. Corp. – Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), both involved classes of plaintiffs, although these
cases did not turn on class action issues.
30
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452–53 (plurality opinion) (performing arbitrability assessment).
31
Stolt-Neilsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 559 U.S. 662, 662 (2010).
32
Id. at 677 (finding that arbitrator exceeded powers under FAA §10(a)(4)).
33
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2017).
34
Id. at 1627 (conducting conflict of federal laws analysis).
35
The average number of opinions per case situated as a class action is roughly 3.1 opinions. In comparison,
the remaining 38 cases in the data set generated an average of 1.8 opinions.
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preemption cases, 3) two cases considering conflicts between the FAA and other federal law,
4) one case involved a jurisdictional question, and 5) one case involved review of an
arbitration award.
The data discussed in this section falls into one of two categories: 1) opinions in
cases that involved a class action; 2) opinions in non-class action cases. The first category
includes both cases explicitly addressing class action issues, as well as cases situated as a
class, but presenting different arbitration issues for the Court. By dividing the cases in this
manner, these cases asked whether the Supreme Court interprets FAA cases differently when
a class action is involved.
The data uncover interesting trends. Chart 1 depicts the percentage reliance on
selected tools of statutory interpretation between class and non-class cases within majority
opinions and dissenting opinions. For some tools of interpretation, the rate of reliance on the
tool is nearly the same whether or not the case involves a class. In other instances, sizable
differences exist.
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Chart 1
Class
Actions
Majorities

Non-Class
Action
Majorities

Class
Actions
Dissents

NonClass
Action
Dissents

Text

100%

81%

40%

50%

Whole Act

46%

35%

13%

14%

Other Fed
Stat

23%

11%

20%

7%

FAA
Precedent

100%

81%

53%

39%

Other
Precedent

69%

41%

27%

36%

Arb Canon

62%

41%

7%

7%

Legislative
History – All

7%

14%

27%

18%

Practical
Consequences

54%

57%

60%*

29%*

Intent or
Purpose

46%

43%

53%

50%

* One asterisk (*) indicates a p-value between 0.05 and 0.01 in a chi square pairwise
comparison between class action and non-class action majorities and dissents.
Some of the data are interesting because they are different between class and nonclass opinions. Tools of interpretation with notable differences include: 1) reliance on the text
of the FAA, 2) reliance on other statutes, 3) reliance on FAA precedent, 4) reliance on nonFAA precedent, 5) reliance on the arbitration canon, and 6) reliance on legislative history. For
two tools, practical consequences and intent or purpose, the most interesting finding is that
the use of those tools was not different from the non-class action opinions.
To determine if the differences between class opinion types (majority or dissent) and
non-class opinion types (majority or dissent), I conducted a chi square pairwise analysis. Due
to the small sample size, this analysis only resulted in one statistically significant pair – the
reliance on practical consequences in dissenting opinions. Although not a true significance,
57
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the pairwise comparisons for majority opinions relying on the FAA text, FAA precedent, and
non-FAA Supreme Court precedent could be described as trending towards significance –
meaning that if the trends continue over a larger sample, it could become a significant
difference.

A.

Reliance on the Text in Class Action Opinions

The data showed a sizeable difference in rate of reliance on the text of the FAA in
both majority and dissenting opinions between class and non-class cases. Majority opinions
relied more frequently on the text in class cases compared to non-class cases, while dissenting
opinions had a lower rate of reliance on the text compared to non-class dissents. Every single
majority opinion involving a class relied on the text of the FAA, a curious finding given that
the FAA does not say anything about class actions.
From a purely theoretical standpoint, I would have expected class-action arbitration
cases to rely primarily on non-text sources because the FAA does mention class actions.
However, the Bazzle decision is the only case in this set in which none of its four opinions
relied on the text.36 Bazzle involved a putative class action against a bank for alleged
violations of the Truth in Lending Act.37 In the early 2000s, the concept of a class action
arbitration was new – but one that potentially could have been foreseen due to the Court
paving the way for arbitration of statutory claims.38 Bazzle was essentially an arbitrability
case – because the question for the Court was “who decides” whether a class action can
proceed in the face of a contract without guidance on the issue.39 Bazzle fell on the heels of
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, which made sweeping pronouncements regarding the
arbitrator’s ability to rule on “gateway” issues.40 Perhaps because of the timing, the plurality
in Bazzle relied almost exclusively on prior precedent, such as Howsam and the earlier First
Options case to put the class action decision in the hands of arbitrators, not courts.41 The other
opinions in Bazzle similarly relied – or rejected – prior precedent, without considering other
tools of interpretation, including the text.

36

Because the Bazzle decision is a plurality decision, I did not include the plurality opinion in the category of
“majority” cases. The remaining cases in the class action docket all included a majority opinion, and all of
those majority opinions relied on the text of the FAA, thus resulting in the 100% reliance calculation. For the
purposes of my taxonomy, I considered this plurality opinion in the group of “other” opinions that are neither
majority opinions or true dissenting opinions.
37
Green Tree v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 448–49 (2003) (discussing facts and procedural history).
38
Although Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) was not the first case allowing for
arbitration of claims falling under federal statutes, the majority’s sweeping endorsement of arbitrators and
arbitration opened the door for more and more businesses to include arbitration agreements within employment
and consumer contracts.
39
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 449–50 (discussing the various approaches to the arbitrability questions taken in the two
consolidated cases before the Court).
40
See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (holding that arbitrators have broad power
to decide issues involving contract defenses, even if those defenses would undermine the contract as a whole,
and arguably the arbitration agreement).
41
Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 452 (distinguishing from First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)).
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In the ensuing years, the Bazzle decision became a lightening-rod and was
essentially limited to its facts by Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds.42 The Court expressed concern
that no single issue in Bazzle garnered five votes43 and noted that the decision appeared to
have “baffled” the parties, who “misunderstood” its holding.44 While Bazzle did not rely on
the text at all, the Stolt-Nielsen Court went to great lengths to quote extensively from Sections
2 and 4 of the FAA to cut against the prevailing trend that Bazzle allowed arbitrators to
determine whether a case could proceed as a class.45 The Court’s decision in ATT v.
Concepcion followed suit, with extensive citation to Section 2 as it expanded the preemptive
power of the FAA over state law.46 The other cases in this set followed suit.
One reason why this set of cases has particularly high textual reliance may be
precisely because the FAA does not address issues relating to class action arbitrations.
Without explicit guidance, majority decisions may seek to buttress its decisions on the
statutory provisions closest to answering the question. Another reason for high textual
reliance may be due to the authorship of the majority opinions. Justice Scalia authors four of
the thirteen majority class action opinions, including Concepcion, described in more detail
below. Other known textualists, including Justices Gorsuch and Alito authored two and one
majority opinion in this set, respectively.
B.

Reliance on FAA Precedent and the Arbitration Canon

Although reliance on the text in class action cases may be surprising, reliance on
former FAA precedent and the arbitration canon is expected. Similar to reliance on the text,
100% of majority opinions relied on prior FAA precedent in those opinions, compared to 81%
of majority opinions in non-class action cases. Because the FAA does not address class action
issues directly, I expected the Court to create its own jurisprudence in this area and then
continue to rely on it going forward.
More surprising, however, is the rate of reliance on FAA precedent among
dissenting opinions. Dissenting opinions relied on FAA precedent in 53% of class action
dissenting opinions, compared to just 39% of non-class action dissenting opinions. One
explanation for the higher reliance on FAA precedent among dissenting opinions is that as the
law emerges in this area, the Justices have different opinions of the earlier precedent, and both
sets of opinions are relying on the same cases, but reaching different conclusions.
American Express Colors v. Italian Colors fits this description. The question in
Italian Colors was the proper application of an earlier decision – that of Green Tree v.
Randolph. The Randolph case held that a party who could prove financial stress would make

42

See Stolt-Nielson SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l, 559 U.S. 662 (2010). In the interim, the Court heard two other
arbitration cases that involved underlying class actions: See Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, 540 U.S. 440
(2006), and Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49 (2009). Yet, the class action issues were not particularly
salient in these cases.
43
Stolt-Nielsen SA, 559 U.S. at 679 (“Thus, Bazzle did not yield a majority decision on any of the three
questions.”).
44
Id. at 680.
45
Id. at 681–82.
46
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341 (2011).
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the arbitral forum inaccessible could not vindicate rights under a statute.47 In Italian Colors,
the Court considered the application of Randolph to cases involving class action waivers and
claims of financial inability to pay for expert witnesses.48 The majority relied on Randolph
and held that the “vindication of statutory rights” doctrine was limited to costs associated with
access to the arbitral forum, i.e., arbitrator fees and administrative costs.49 Justice Kagan, in
dissent, similarly relied on Randolph, but found that Randolph should be read broadly, to
ensure that the structure of the arbitration – here individual arbitration – did not financially
impact the parties to the point requiring them to drop their claims.50 Similarly, in
CompuCredit v. Greenwood,51 the majority and dissenting opinions agreed on the legal
principle to be applied – in this case, whether the Credit Repair Organization Act contained a
“contrary congressional command” such that claims under it could not be arbitrated – and the
majority found no such command,52 while the dissent disagreed with the conclusion.53
The arbitration canon is essentially a presumption in favor of arbitration that was
created through FAA precedent. If reliance on FAA precedent is high in this subset of cases,
presumably reliance on the arbitration canon would be similarly high. The data show that
62% of majority opinions relied on the arbitration canon, compared to 41% of non-class
action cases, while the dissenting opinions relied on the arbitration canon at roughly the same
rate – 7% across all dissents. A higher percentage of dissenting opinions (20% of class action
dissents), compared to majority opinions (15% of majority opinions), explicitly rejected or
cited the canon without reliance within the opinion.
My data show that the arbitration canon may be used to buttress arguments in the
most controversial class action arbitration cases. Majority opinions that relied on the
arbitration canon include: Epic Systems v. Lewis,54 DirecTV v. Imburia,55 American Express v.
Italian Colors,56 CompuCredit v .Greenwood,57 and ATT Mobility v. Concepcion.58 All of
these decisions were controversial, as evidenced by multiple opinions for each of these cases
and narrow vote margins. Surprisingly, the cases which relied on the arbitration canon cut
across arbitration areas of law. Given that the arbitration canon is essentially a rule regarding
arbitrability, I would have expected a disproportionate number of cases relying on the
47

Green Tree Fin. Corp. – Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 80–81 (2000) (holding that the doctrine of
vindication of statutory rights extends to financial inability to access the arbitral forum).
48
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231-32 (2013).
49
Id. at 236 (“That would certainly cover a provision in an arbitration agreement forbidding the assertion of
certain statutory rights. And it would perhaps cover filing and administrative fees attached to arbitration that are
so high as to make access to the forum impracticable.”).
50
Id. at 242–43 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Randolph, we found, had failed to meet that burden: The evidence she
offered was ‘too speculative.’ But even as we dismissed Randolph’s suit, we reminded courts to protect against
arbitration agreements that make federal claims too costly to bring.”).
51
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95 (2012).
52
Id. at 100–01 (setting forth the requirements of the “contrary congressional command” test as developed
through Supreme Court arbitration precedent).
53
Id. at 115–16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the legal principles were “uncontroversial,” but the
application of those principles was disputed).
54
See 138 S.Ct. 1612 (2017).
55
See 577 U.S. 47 (2015).
56
See 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
57
See 565 U.S. 95 (2012).
58
See 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
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arbitration canon to be arbitrability cases. Instead, the use of the arbitrability canon also can
be found in preemption cases, such as Concepcion, conflicts of federal law cases, such as
Epic Systems and CompuCredit, in addition to arbitrability cases, such as Imburgia.
C.

Reliance on Other Statutory and Case Law

Because the FAA does not address issues specific to class actions, I hypothesized
that the class action cases would have a significantly higher reliance on outside law, both
statutory law and case law. As a general matter, that hypothesis is supported by the data;
however, that hypothesis is supported much more strongly among majority opinions than
dissenting opinions.
Majority opinions relied on non-FAA statutory and case authorities at a rate trending
towards a significantly higher rate than non-class action majorities. Among majority
decisions, 23% relied on federal statutes or rules outside of the FAA, compared to only 11%
in the non-class action cases. Majority opinions relied on non-FAA precedent in 69% class
action majorities, compared to only 41% in non-class majorities. Both of these differences
could become statistically significant if these trends continue at the same rates.. In two cases,
the majority opinion relied on both outside statutory law and outside case law. In Southland v.
Keating, Justice Burger relied on a wide variety of tools, including relying on non-FAA
arbitration law,59 non-arbitration law,60 and non-arbitration rules and statutes.61 The other
casethat relied on both outside statutory and case law is New Prime v. Oliveira.62 While
Justice Burger in the Southland case utilized more than a dozen different tools of
interpretation in that opinion, Justice Gorsuch’s Oliveria case heavily relied on textualist
tools, in addition to these non-FAA sources. In Oliveria, Justice Gorsuch relied on nonarbitration law to support his use of a language canon as well as statutes governing railroading
to ultimately conclude that the FAA does not govern independent contractors in the
transportation industry.63
Many cases relying on non-FAA law draw from other areas of arbitration law –
notably labor arbitration.64 The other area of influence outside of arbitration law appears to be
laws governing civil procedure, both case law and statutory law.65 Although none of these
areas of outside law are surprising, they demonstrate an interesting trend that they may be
more persuasive in cases implicating class actions than in non-class action cases. Perhaps
59

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7 (1984) (relying on non-FAA arbitration law).
Id. at 11–12 (relying on constitutional law); id. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(relying on non-arbitration federal preemption law).
61
Id. at 15 (relying on statutes regarding civil procedure); id. at 20 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (relying on analogies with the Securities Act).
62
New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532 (2019).
63
Id. at 543–44 (holding that independent contractors in the transportation industry are not governed under the
FAA); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1624 (citing non-FAA precedent in support of the
application of a canon).
64
See, e.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (relying on labor arbitration precedent);
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 567-68 (2013) (same); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682–83 (2010); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003).
65
See, e.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (relying on civil procedure law); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. – Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (relying on civil procedure law governing interlocutory
appeals); Stolt-Nielsen SA, 559 U.S. at 690 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing civil procedure law).
60
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these sources allow the Court to interpret class action cases consistently across the various
arbitration lines of cases.
D.

Reliance on Practical Consequences, Intent, and Purpose

The most surprising finding is that the Supreme Court does considers practical
consequences, intent, and purpose at the same frequency, with one exception, across class and
non-class cases. Among majority opinions, the class action docket relies on practical
consequences in 54% of opinions, compared to 57% of non-class action opinions, and the
class action docket relies on the intent or purpose of the FAA in 46% of opinions, compared
to 43% of non-majority opinions. For dissenting opinions, however, practical consequences
are cited twice as often, 60%, as in non-class action dissenting opinions, 29%. Intent or
purpose are cited at roughly the same rates in class action, 53%, and non-class action dissents,
50%.
Regarding majority decisions, the fact that practical concerns and intent show no
difference between class action and non-class action cases was unexpected. Three of the most
visible, and controversial, class action arbitration cases – i.e., Stolt-Nielsen, Concepcion, and
Italian Colors – involved significant reliance on policy and intent, leading me to assume that
this trend would be true across the whole class action docket. These three cases rely on probusiness policy considerations to buttress its textual arguments. The Alito majority decision in
Stolt-Nielsen claimed that class arbitration “changes the nature of arbitration,” potentially
jeopardizing the benefits of arbitration, such as “lower costs, greater efficiency and speed, and
the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”66 Justice Scalia’s
Concepcion decision took the practical and policy to a higher level, with statements such as
arbitration being “poorly suited to the higher stakes of class litigation” and the idea that “class
arbitration greatly increases risks to defendants.”67 The Italian Color majority relied on these
previous policy and purpose statements, concluding that Concepcion “resolves this case,”
again expressing concern about whether the “speedy resolution” of bilateral arbitration could
be preserved in a class process.68 While these statements were highly visible, statistically,
they did not create a sea change in the reliance patterns among majority decisions.
Among dissenting opinions, the rate of reliance on policy considerations is
significantly higher within the class action docket. The policy concern most often cited is one
of fairness – notably whether the process is fair if the claimants must proceed not only in
arbitration but also in bilateral, i.e., one-on-one, arbitration against a company. In the Italian
Colors decision, Justice Kagan quipped that the Court’s opinion sends the following message
to claimants who cannot afford to maintain the costs of their case: “Too darn bad.”69 In
Imburgia, Justice Ginsburg expressed concern that DIRECTV, a party having “hugely
unequal bargaining power” over customers further reaped the “benefit of an ambiguity” in
drafting its own contract.70 She also worried that the Court’s decision in Epic Systems

66
67
68
69
70

Stolt-Nielsen SA, 559 U.S. at 685–86.
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350.
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. at 238–39.
Id. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 65 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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allowing class waivers in employment contracts would lead to the “underenforcement of
federal and state statutes designed to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers.”71
Although majority opinions cite purpose and policy reasons with similar reliance as
non-class action opinions, these tools of interpretation are highly cited overall, and continue
to be a trusted source of FAA interpretation. Dissenting justices appear to appeal to those
practical consequences, particularly in these cases with broad impact on individuals.
E.

Other Considerations

Two final observations can be made from this set of cases. First, agency deference
was not a tool on which the Court relied in this dataset. The only case explicitly dealing with
an agency determination is Epic Systems v. Lewis,72 in which the Court determined whether
the NLRA permitted a waiver of class action rights.73 Despite the NLRB rulings on the
issue,74 the Court held that the NLRB did not have authority to interpret the FAA.75
Therefore, no opinion relies on agency deference as a tool interpreting the FAA. Second,
although legislative history is not used particularly frequently across the entire dataset,
majority opinions relied on legislative history only half as frequently as they do in non-class
action cases – while dissenting opinions relied on it more frequently. The legislative history,
of course, do not speak to class action issues, so these opinions are using legislative history to
interpret the questions outside of their implications on class actions.
F.

Future of Class Action Docket?

The Court’s class action cases will undoubtedly remain the most controversial cases
among the cases under the FAA. Although the question presented rarely directly involves
class processes, the broader implications are far greater. For example, the Concepcion case
was, at its core, a case about preemption – but its impact on class action arbitration is
potentially farther reaching than its ruling on preemption.76
The Court still appears to be grappling with the class action arbitration docket. The
cases have become more fragmented over time – not less. Every class action arbitration case
involves at least two opinions, and the 2019 decision of Lamps Plus v. Varela generated six
opinions.77 Perhaps because of the divisions on the Court relating to class actions, the

71

Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1646 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1612.
73
Id. at 1619 (“Far from conflicting, the Arbitration Act and the NLRA have long enjoyed separate spheres of
influence and neither permits this Court to declare the parties’ agreements unlawful.”).
74
See D.R. Horton, Inc. v. Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd., 737 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2013) (discussing the NLRB rule
regarding class waivers).
75
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1629–30 (holding that agency deference is inappropriate); see also Allen S.
Al-Haj, Which Statute Will Trump: The Validity of Class-Action Waivers in Employment Arbitration
Agreements, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 105, 116–19 (2017) (discussing lower court opinions reaching the same
conclusion that the NLRB does not have authority to interpret the FAA).
76
I previously argued the broad scope of Concepcion’s reach in the area of class actions. See Kristen M.
Blankley, Impact Preemption: A New Theory of Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 67 FLA. L. REV. 711
(2015).
77
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
72
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opinions use many tools of interpretation, and some with more frequency than the non-class
action docket. In particular, finding a textual basis to support a class action majority and
building off of prior FAA precedent appear to be requirements for a majority opinion.
Although the Court has entertained class action arbitration cases since the mid1980s, the law has not settled or coalesced around predictable factors. Instead, this set of
complex opinions suggest the law will continue to evolve and expand. As these class action
opinions move in a direction that is increasingly business friendly, the Court can generally be
predicted to vote along political lines.
III. PREEMPTION FINDINGS
While the class action cases cut across the various arbitration legal lines of
precedent, these next three sections consider cases within a distinct legal theory – preemption,
arbitrability, and conflicts of federal law. These three areas are discussed because they have
the most cases and most opinions. Other areas of arbitration law, while important, do not
currently involve enough opinions to make meaningful comparisons. Even these three sets of
data are small and the numbers limit the statistical analyses that can be performed. In each of
these sections, I consider the difference between cases within a specific legal theory and those
outside of that legal theory. For example, I consider preemption opinions in contract with
non-preemption opinions, rather than comparing preemption opinions to arbitrability
decisions. These sections look for statistical significance by drawing out one variable, i.e., the
type of arbitration legal theory, to see if the use of tools of interpretation changes when the
legal theory changes.
This section considers the cases establishing the preemptive effect of the FAA over
contrary state law. In 1984, the Supreme Court in Southland v. Keating78 held, for the first
time, that the FAA has such preemptive power.79 To reach this conclusion, the Court resolved
an ambiguity it created in the 1956 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Company of America80 case
regarding the classification of the FAA under the Erie doctrine over whether the FAA is
better characterized as a substantive or procedural law.81 The Southland Court held that the
FAA is substantive law and, as such, could displace contrary state law under the Supreme
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.82 This section considers the line of cases beginning with
Southland and continuing to the present.
This dataset involves ten distinct cases and twenty-five different opinions. The
Supreme Court decided three of these cases in the 1980s, two in the 1990s, one in the 2000s,
and four in the 2010s. Of the ten cases, one resulted in a single opinion, four involved two
opinions, four involved three opinions, and one case had four separate opinions. Despite the
fact that this group averages 2.5 opinions per case, only one of the decisions, ATT v.
78

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Id. at 16 (“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to
foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements. We hold that §
31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause.”).
80
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198 (1954).
81
Id. at 202 (reading the FAA narrowly to avoid problems involving conflicts with local law); see also Kristen
M. Blankley, supra note 76, at 733 (discussing the history of FAA preemption and the problems with the
Bernhardt opinion).
82
See Allen S. Al-Haj, supra note 75.
79
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Concepcion, involves a 5-4 split. This set of cases involves one per curium case, two eightJustice majorities, three seven-Justice majorities, three six-Justice majorities, and one 5-4
decision. Only three of these cases involves a class action.
When considering the case ideology, nine of the ten cases resulted in conservative
outcomes, and one had a liberal outcome.83 The Southland case was decided as the public
began to embrace ADR, which helps explain how Justice Burger could have ushered in a line
of overwhelmingly conservative jurisprudence.84 Six of the twenty-five opinions were
authored by Justice Thomas, all but one were dissenting opinions. Justice Thomas’ interesting
role in the preemption literature is discussed in more detail below.
Chart 2 shows the percentage of reliance on individual tools of statutory
interpretation, comparing the majority opinions of preemption cases to all other majority
opinions, and the dissenting opinions of preemption opinions compared to all other dissenting
opinions. I ran a pairwise chi square analysis between these two categories of majority
opinions and these two categories of dissenting opinions.
As with the other analyses in this paper, the small sample size makes finding
significant differences difficult. Two categories have a statistically significant difference:
majority opinions’ reliance on the whole act rule, and majority opinions’ reliance on the intent
or purpose of the FAA. Other categories have observable differences, even if they are not
statistically significant.

83

The Spaeth Supreme Court database, hosted by Washington University Law School, separates
“conservative” from “lilberal” opinions based on factors related to consumers, employees, business, etc. See
Harold J. Spaeth, Lee Epstein, et al., 2021 Supreme Court Database, Version 2021 Release 1. URL:
http://Supremecourtdatabase.org.
84
See Blankley, supra note 3, at 126.

65
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship
Repository,

15

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2022, Iss. 2 [], Art. 7

THE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Chart 2:

Preemption
Majorities

NonPreemption
Majorities

Preemption
Dissents

NonPreemption

Text

100%

83%

33%

52%

Whole Act

10%*

45%*

17%

13%

Other Fed
Stat

10%

15%

8%

13%

FAA
Precedent

100%

83%

42%

45%

Other
Precedent

30%

53%

25%

35%

Arb Canon

70%

40%

8%

6%

Legislative
History – All

20%

10%

25%

19%

Practical
Consequences

50%

58%

39%

33%

Intent or
Purpose

80%*

35%*

52%

67%

* One asterisk (*) indicates a p-value between 0.05 and 0.01 in a chi square pairwise
comparison between preemption and non-preemption majorities and dissents.
Although only two pairs are statistically significant, the data still show interesting
trends – both where the preemption cases are different and where they are the same as the
non-preemption case. The following sections delve into the data and the underlying cases in
more detail.
A.

The Text and the Whole Act Rule

Surprisingly, the preemption cases have the same total reliance on the text as the
class action cases, despite the fact that only three of the preemption cases involve underlying
66
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class actions. The Southland v Keating case, discussed above,85 utilized nearly every tool of
interpretation in this first case recognizing the preemptive effect of the FAA, and the
remainder of the cases also relied on the text of these opinions.
Normally, the textual reliance would be unsurprising, particularly given the
ideological orientation of this set of cases. However, most of the majority opinions – many of
which are conservative holdings – were authored by liberal-leaning justices.86 In addition to
Justice Burger’s Southland opinion, Justice Thurgood Marshall authored Perry v. Thomas,87
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinions in both the Allied-Bruce Terminix88 case and
DirecTV v. Imburgia,89 Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinions in both the Cassoroto90
case and Preston v. Ferrer91, and Justice Kagan authored Kindred Nursing v. Clark92 decision.
Only two majority opinions had conservative-leaning authors, notably Chief Justice
Rehnquist in Volt v. Leland Stanford93 and Justice Scalia in ATT v. Concepcion.94 The per
curium decision in Marmet Health Care95 has no author. Other than the Concepcion case, the
Court seems relatively aligned in its views on the preemptive effect of the FAA, particularly
as it relates to the text of the statute.
The pattern of use of the whole act rule in the preemption cases is notable. All of the
preemption cases lie on an interpretation of FAA Section 2, which makes arbitration
agreements “enforceable.”96 The FAA, however, does not speak to the issue of preemption,
and the Southland dissent, in particular, relied on this tool to argue that the remainder of the
FAA argues against the fundamental question of whether the FAA is “substantive” or
“procedural.” Justice O’Connor cited the jurisdictional language in FAA Sections 3 and 4,
and argued that if those sections facially apply only in federal courts, then FAA Section 2
should be read together as a procedural statute with no application in state courts.97
Answering Justice O’Conner, the majority relied on the plain text of Section 2’s “involving
commerce” language in holding that Congress intended the Act to fall under its commerce
power.98
Indeed, at least seven provisions of the FAA specifically contemplate federal court
jurisdiction.99 The lack of jurisdictional language in Section 2 led to various theories
regarding Congress’ intent from the scholarly community,100 but the Supreme Court has
85

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
Blankley, supra note 3, at 127, 130, 146.
87
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
88
Allied Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
89
DirecTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 557 U.S. 47 (2015).
90
Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Cassorotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
91
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008).
92
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421 (2017).
93
Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
94
AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
95
Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012).
96
9 U.S.C. § 2.
97
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. at 22–23 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4).
98
Id. at 14 (rejecting Justice O’Connor’s whole act argument in favor of the language of Section 2).
99
9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 16 (provisions containing express jurisdictional language).
100
Blankley, supra note 76, at 721–22 (citing David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism,
and State Public Policy, 101 Geo. L.J. 1217 (2013), Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland:
Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002)).
86
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largely agreed on the interpretation of Section 2 as substantive law with preemptive power.
Because of the disconnect between the language in Section 2 invoking the limits of the
Commerce Clause and the language of other sections invoking jurisdictional requirements,
the scant use of the whole act rule in this set of cases is unsurprising.
B.

FAA Precedent and the Arbitration Canon

Similar to the text, the preemption cases have similar levels of reliance on FAA
precedent and the arbitration canon compared to the class action cases. For this set of cases,
the biggest differences are found between preemption majorities and non-preemption
majorities. The dissenting opinions show very little differences comparing preemption dissent
to non-preemption dissents.
Regarding preemption majority opinions, this set of cases also showed 100%
reliance on prior precedent, compared to 83% of non-preemption majorities that relied on
prior FAA precedent. These numbers are quite similar to those in the class action set of cases,
despite their relatively small number of overlap of cases. As noted above, this particular
difference is not statistically significant, but it demonstrates an interesting trend that could
potentially lead to significance over a larger set of data. The 100% reliance on FAA precedent
in preemption majorities should not be surprising. The text of the FAA does not contain an
express preemption clause, and these cases continue to build upon themselves in an
increasingly broad manner.101
This set of majority opinions also relied on the arbitration canon heavily, in 70% of
the opinions. Although not statistically significant, the number is much higher than the 40%
of majority opinions that relied on the arbitration canon in non-preemption cases. The
differences between these two groups could become statistically significant if these trends
continue in the same proportions.
Perhaps the most unusual observation from the preemption cases is the use of the
arbitration canon, which is partly a rule of arbitrability. The arbitration canon declares a
“national policy favoring arbitration,”102 as well as a rule of construction that “ambiguities as
to the scope of the arbitration clause itself be resolved in favor of arbitration.”103 In other
cases, the canon describes the requirement that arbitration agreements be “placed on same
footing as other contracts.”104 The preemption cases cite all of these propositions, even though
they do not all apply to preemption. While the “national policy” language can support a
preemption analysis, the “scope” language,105 often cited with the “national policy” language,
does not apply to preemption at all. Preemption analyses consider a state law’s applicability
given the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements. The scope of the arbitration
agreement and the clarity with which it is written is irrelevant. The “footing” language could
apply to either a preemption analysis or an arbitrability analysis.

101
102
103
104
105

Blankley, supra note 3, at 137.
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008).
See Volt Info. Scis. Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989).
Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Cassorotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
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In all, these cases show a clear preference for majority opinions to cite prior FAA
precedent, as well as the arbitration canon when compared to non-preemption cases. The
other types of opinions did not show clear difference in these areas.
C.

Intent or Purpose

When considering the purposivist tools, practical consequences are relied on at
roughly similar rates in majority opinions (50%) and dissenting opinions (39%) compared to
their non-preemption counterparts (58% and 33%). However, the difference in reliance on
intent is statistically significant between majority preemption (80%) decisions with majority
non-preemption decisions (35%). Dissenting preemption opinions relied on intent or purpose
(52%) less than non-preemption counterparts (67%), but the difference is not statistically
significant in this small dataset.
With the exception of the Concepcion case, in majority decisions, the practical
consequences on which the Court relies are relatively garden-variety concerns about
administration of cases or the effect of decisions on state legislatures. For instance, in the
Terminix case, the majority noted that the seminal Southland decision led to no “unforeseen
practical problems” after the ruling ten years prior.106 The Kindred Nursing majority invoked
the absurdity doctrine in holding that Kentucky could not undermine the FAA through the
operation of attorney-in-fact arrangements.107
The Concepcion decision merits additional commentary due to its extensive reliance
on practical consequences. Justice Scalia provided at least six different arguments based on
policy in the majority decision. First, the majority outlined concerns that a class action
procedure cannot be streamlined due to its complex nature108 and longer timelines.109 Second,
it expressed doubt that the confidentiality usually afforded to arbitration could be
maintained.110 Third, the Court doubted whether the parties could find an arbitrator competent
to handled class action matters.111 Fourth, the class action protocol developed by the
American Arbitration Association are also complex.112 Fifth, “class actions greatly increases
risks to defendants.”113 Finally, the Court notes: “Arbitration is poorly suited to the higher
stakes of class litigation.”114 The extent of the considerations is an outlier among the
preemption docket – but it is certainly in line with the other cases in the class action docket.
The most notable trend in the preemption cases is the reliance on the intent or
purpose of the FAA. Majority opinions relied on intent 80% of the time, compared with only
106

Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995).
Kindred Nursing Ctrs., Inc. v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421, 1428–20 (2017) (“The FAA would then mean nothing
at all—its provisions rendered helpless to prevent even the most blatant discrimination against arbitration.”).
108
AT&T Mobility, Inc., 563 U.S. at 344 (“The point of affording parties discretion in designing arbitration
processes is to allow for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of dispute.”).
109
Id. at 348–49 (discussing the timeline of bilateral arbitration compared to class arbitration).
110
Id. at 348 (“Confidentiality becomes more difficult.”).
111
Id. (“And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with some expertise relevant to the classcertification question, arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of
certification, such as the protection of absent parties.”).
112
Id. at 349 (discussing the intricacies of the AAA class action rules).
113
AT&T Mobility Inc., 563 U.S. at 350.
114
Id.
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35% of non-preemption majorities. Dissenting opinions cited intent 52% of the time,
compared to 67% of the time in non-preemption majorities. These findings, while significant,
are not particularly surprising because the legal question is whether Congress intended to
supplant state law to the contrary.115 The only cases in which the majority decisions failed to
invoke Congress’ intent were 1) the short, per curium decision in Marmet Health Care116
which relied on only a few tools of interpretation, and 2) DIRECTV v. Imburgia,117 which
relied more on contract law than the FAA.
Dissenting opinions invoking practical consequences focus primarily on the issue of
fairness; however, less than 40% of dissenting opinions discuss this tool of interpretation at
all. For instance, in the Imburgia case, Justice Ginsberg’s dissent expressed concern with the
“hugely unequal bargaining power” between the parties in a case involving a consumer
product.118 And in Breyer’s dissent in Concepcion, he correctly predicted the surge of mass
arbitration proceedings when he noted: “a single class proceeding is surely more efficient than
thousands of separate proceedings for identical claims.”119 Reliance on Congressional intent
similarly appears in less than 40% of preemption dissents. Justice Stevens concluded in
Southland that Congress could not have intended the FAA to have preemptive power after
discussing a number of other statutory tools,120 and reiterates this point in Perry v. Thomas.121
Justice Thomas also relies on intent in his dissents in the preemption cases, starting with the
Allied-Bruce Terminix case.122 A more complete discussion of Thomas’ preemption
philosophies are discussed below.123
D.

Other Considerations

A handful of additional tools of interpretation in the preemption cases merit
additional note. First, legislative history is relied on more in the preemption cases than nonpreemption cases across all opinion types, most notably in concurring and other opinions.
Although the number of these cases is low (2 majority opinions; 3 dissenting opinions, and 1
other opinion), the rate of reliance might suggest that the Court is more interested in
contemporaneous evidence, such as legislative history, in the preemption cases than other
115

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (“In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well
as federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of
arbitration agreements.”).
116
Marmet Health Care Ctr. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532 (2012).
117
DIRECTV v. Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 49 (2015).
118
Id. at 65 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
119
AT&T Mobility Inc., 563 U.S. at 363. One of the practical results of Concepction is the advent of the mass
arbitration, or the process of “simultaneously fil[ing] thousands of arbitration claims” as a response to a class
action waiver in a commercial contract. Scott Medintz, How Consumers Are Using Mass Arbitration to Fight
Amazon, Intuit, and Other Corporate Giants, CONSUMER REP. (Aug. 13, 2021), available at
https://www.consumerreports.org/contracts-arbitration/consumers-using-mass-arbitration-to-fight-corporategiants-a8232980827/ (last visited May. 30, 2022).
120
Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding no intent by Congress to give the FAA
preemptive power).
121
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court gave the FAA “a
pre-emptive scope that Congress certainly did not intend”).
122
Allied-Bruce Terminix v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 272, 292 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
123
See infra Part III.E (describing the “Thomas Effect”).
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arbitration cases. Reliance on legislative history is higher in the preemption cases compared
to the arbitrability and conflicts of federal law cases.
Another interesting observation is the lack of reliance on non-FAA precedent in
preemption cases compared to other types of cases. Because the preemption holding is not
based on the text of the FAA, one might expect reliance on outside law to be higher in this
area. To the contrary, the Court appears to be relying on its own precedent (i.e., prior FAA
cases) and building upon itself in the preemption cases. This finding is in contrast with the
arbitrability and conflicts of federal law cases, with both of those sets of cases – and the
arbitrability cases in particular – relying on outside case law more frequently.
E.

The “Thomas Effect”

Although not a tool of interpretation, Justice Thomas’s vote in the preemption cases
suggests that a “Thomas effect” might be present in the FAA docket. Although the name
mimics that of the “Scalia effect” hypothesis (i.e., that Scalia “singlehandedly” discouraged
the Court from using legislative history as an interpretive tool),124 the “Thomas effect” refers
to his unique role in preserving the preemptive effect of the FAA.
Early in his tenure, Justice Thomas was among the most vocal opponents of the
FAA’s preemptive power. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Terminix case,
on the basis that Southland was wrongly decided.125 In his Terminix dissent, Justice Thomas
relied on at least four separate tools of interpretation to demonstrate that the FAA should have
no effect in state courts, including plain language,126 the whole act rule,127 non-FAA
precedent,128 and Congressional intent.129 Further, he rejected the practical argument that
parties have been relying on the Southland decision in their contract drafting.130
Following Terminix, Justice Thomas dissented in Cassorotto and Ferrer in short
opinions invoking his dissent in Terminix.131 Justice Thomas’ view that the FAA did not
apply in state courts applied equally in the preemption decisions, as well as other arbitration

124

David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of Legislative
History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653 (2010).
125
Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 285–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing that the major holding of
Southland “are wrong”).
126
Id. at 293 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“There still would be no textual basis for Southland ‘s suggestion that §
2 requires the States to enforce those agreements through the remedy of specific performance—that is, by
forcing the parties to submit to arbitration.”).
127
Id. at 293–94 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (reading FAA Section 2 together with Sections 3 and 4 that contain
jurisdictional language).
128
Id. at 292–93 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (relying on other Commerce Clause cases).
129
Id. at 292 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (providing an argument disproving that “that Congress both viewed § 2
as a statement of substantive law and believed that it created no federal-question jurisdiction”).
130
Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 295 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I do not doubt that innumerable contracts
containing arbitration clauses have been written since 1984 . . . [s]till, I see no reason to think that the costs of
overruling Southland are unacceptably high.”).
131
See Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 363 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“As I have stated on many
previous occasions, I believe that the Federal Arbitration Act does not apply to proceedings in state courts.”);
Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Cassorotto, 517 U.S. 681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“For the reasons given in
my dissent last Term in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, I remain of the view that § 2 of the Federal
Arbitration Act does not apply to proceedings in state courts. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.”).
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decisions originating in federal courts.132 By the 2010s, Justice Thomas’ vote in preemption
cases was predictable given his consistent vote and reasoning.
The “Thomas Effect” however, refers to the phenomenon that Justice Thomas will
vote against this otherwise well-stated position if a conservative outcome cannot be
maintained by the remaining Justices. In the 2011 landmark Concepcion case, Justice Thomas
concurred and provided the critical fifth vote in this five-to-four decision. In Concepcion,
Justice Thomas makes a hyper-technical argument that FAA Section 2 might apply to
situations dealing with the “making of an agreement to arbitrate” even if in state court.133 This
argument, however, does not appear to be a change of heart. In two cases following
Concpecion, Justice Thomas continued to dissent on the basis that the FAA “does not apply to
proceedings in state court.”134 Both of those cases involved solid, conservative majorities that
did not require his vote.
This phenomenon does not appear to be limited to the Court’s preemption cases. In
Lamps Plus v. Varela,135 Justice Thomas joins the five-Justice conservative majority, despite
concerns about the FAA’s application in state courts. Although the Varela case deals
primarily with arbitrability issues, Justice Thomas concurred and wrote separately because he
remains “skeptical of this Court’s implied pre-emption precedents.”136 Coincidentally, both
Concepcion and Varela involve class action questions, and that fact may be the motivating
factor in joining the more conservative justices when necessary to reach a desired outcome –
i.e., limitations of class actions.
Whether the “Thomas Effect” will be necessary going into the future remains to be
seen. The Court now has a six-to-three conservative majority since the elevation of Justice
Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court in 2020. Justice Thomas’ vote may not be
necessary if the remaining Justices vote in line with ideological principles, particularly in
class action cases.
F.

Future of the Preemption Docket?

The trajectory of the preemption docket is to preserve the preemptive power of the
FAA, despite its controversial beginning in the Southland decision. Outside of the class action
docket, the preemption principles appear to be broadly supported, as many of the decisions
enjoy strong majorities. Since Southland, the most controversial preemption case was the
Concepcion decision, which maintained and expanded on the FAA’s preemptive power due,
in part, to Justice Thomas’ uncharacteristic concurrence among a long line of nearly identical
dissenting opinions.
As for the expected tools of interpretation in future preemption cases, the current
trends of relying on the text and the prior FAA cases will likely continue. Because the FAA’s
preemptive power is a matter of common law (as opposed to express preemption in the text of
the statute), these two should continue to be the most commonly used tools. The heavy
132

See Preston, 552 U.S. at 363 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing decisions in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle
and Buckeye Check Cashing v. Cardegna, both of which are decisions concerning arbitrability).
133
AT&T Mobility, Inc. v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 353 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring).
134
Kindred Nursing Ctrs., Inc. v. Clark, 137 S.Ct. 1421, 1429 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting); DIRECTV v.
Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 59 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
135
Lamps Plus v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419–20 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring).
136
Id. at 1420 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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reliance on Congress’ intent should also continue because the conflict preemption inquiry
essentially asks about intent to displace contrary state law.
Any changes in the trajectory of the Court’s preemption docket would likely require
the Court to embrace tools of interpretation that have been rejected so far. Notably, renewed
interest in the whole act rule would be a persuasive ground to overrule Southland and provide
a textual basis to limiting or curtailing the preemptive power of the FAA. Given the
conservative leaning of the current Court, this tool may be more palatable than resorting to an
analysis of tools such as legislative history. In all, however, the Court will likely continue on
the path of robust preemptive power for the FAA, particularly if the preemption cases arise in
class action cases.
IV. ARBITRABILITY FINDINGS
The set of “arbitrability” cases in this dataset are those cases in which the question
presented asks “who decides” a claim or defense – i.e., is it a question for the arbitrator or a
question for the courts. The Court has addressed arbitrability questions since the 1930s and
40s, when it decided two admiralty cases turning, in part, on the identification of the proper
decision-maker.137 More recently, this section deals with Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin138
and First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan139 and the jurisprudence following therefrom.
This subset involves nineteen distinct cases and thirty-nine different opinions. These
cases span the entirety of the Supreme Court’s arbitration docket, with four cases decided
before 1980, one case in the 1980s, one in the 1990s, six cases in the first decade of the
2000s, and seven cases in the 2010s. Of the nineteen cases, six cases had only one opinion,
ten involved two opinions, one involved three opinions, one case had four separate opinions,
and one case had six opinions. The average number of opinions per case is just over two. This
set of cases involves three per curium cases, five additional nine-Justice majorities, two eightjustice majorities, two seven-justice majorities, two six-justice majorities, four five-Justice
majorities, and one plurality opinion. Seven of these cases in which the primary legal issue is
arbitrability are also cases involving class actions.140
Chart 3 shows the percentage of reliance on individual tools of statutory
interpretation, comparing the majority opinions of arbitrability cases to all other majority
opinions, and the dissenting opinions of arbitrability opinions compared to all other dissenting
137

Anaconda v. Am. Sugar Refin. Co., 322 U.S. 42, 45 (1944) (discussing a party’s ability to proceed in
admiralty court with an arbitration agreement in a contract); Marine Trans. Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263,
275–76 (1932) (holding that the court makes the initial determination to send a case to arbitration and thereafter
has jurisdiction to confirm a resulting award).
138
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
139
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
140
One of these class action cases is Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., which was a difficult case to
fit into one category. At its most limited, the holding of Stolt-Nielsen SA is a holding dealing with the review
of an arbitrator’s clause construction award, the authority used to issue such an award, and whether the
arbitration award is subject to vacatur. 559 U.S. at 676–77. If this were the only holding of Stolt-Nielsen SA,
then the case would easily fit within the category of cases dealing with vacatur and judicial review. However,
Stolt-Neisen SA has broader implications for arbitrability in that it essentially removed the authority for an
arbitrator to decide that certain contracts can support a class arbitration hearing. Id. at 686–87 (holding that
class procedures are too dissimilar from bilateral procedures to allow an arbitrator to hold that a contract would
allow them without specific authorization).
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opinions. I ran a pairwise chi square analysis between these two categories of majority and
dissenting opinions.
Surprisingly, not one pairwise comparison shows a significant difference. In many
instances, the precent reliance on a specific statutory tool is very close to the percent reliance
in the non-arbitrability cases. In two instances, both in dissenting opinions, the numbers are
trending towards significance, although currently not statistically significant likely due to the
small sample size. Those two categories are greater reliance on other federal statutes and
greater reliance on non-FAA case law in arbitrability dissents compared to non-arbitrability
dissents.
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Chart 3:
Percent Reliance on Tools of Interpretation
by Subject (Arbitrability) & Opinion Type
Tool of Interpretation

A.
Arbitrability
Majorities

B. NonArbitrability
Majorities

C.
Arbitrability
Dissents

D. NonArbitrability
Dissents

Text

89%

84%

42%

48%

Whole Act

39%

38%

17%

13%

Other Fed Stat

17%

13%

25%

6%

FAA Precedent

83%

88%

50%

42%

Other Precedent

40%

47%

42%

29%

Language Canon

6%

19%

17%

3%

Subs Canon

0%

13%

8%

16%

Arb Canon

33%

53%

17%

3%

Legis Hist – All

11%

13%

8%

26%

Legis Inaction

0%

6%

0%

6%

Practical Conseq

44%

63%

50%

35%

Intent or Purpose

22%

36%

42%

55%

Despite the lack of statistical significance, some trends are still worth noting. For the
arbitrability cases, the next sections look at trends in majority opinions and trends in
dissenting opinions, followed by a discussion of the future of the arbitrability cases.
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A.

Majority Opinions

Majority opinions in the arbitrability caseload appear to be a microcosm of the
arbitration docket as a whole, particularly as the textualist tools are considered. When looking
at the purposivist tools, however, a few differences can be observed, even though none of
them rise to the level of statistical significance.
For the textualist tools of reliance on the text, FAA precedent, and the whole act
rule, the rate of reliance on these tools is extraordinarily close when comparing arbitrability
majorities and non-arbitrability majorities. In arbitrability majorities, the Court relied on the
text at a rate of 89%, compared to 84% in non-arbitrability majorities. The arbitrability
majorities relied on FAA precedent 83% of the time, compared to 88% of the time in nonarbitrability majorities. Keep in mind, however, that although these numbers do not stand out
within the arbitration caseload, they still represent an aberration compared to other types of
cases. In Standing on Its Own Shoulders, I observed large discrepancies in the rate of reliance
on the text and prior caselaw in the arbitration cases compared to other types of cases.141 In
other words, these findings are more important in the comparative study than in this analysis
comparing different types of arbitration cases.
Reliance on the whole act rule is nearly identical when comparing the rates of
reliance between arbitrability majorities (39%) and non-arbitrability majorities (38%). The
two early FAA cases relied on the whole act rule, which is unsurprising as the Court grapples
with the statute for the first few times.142 Prima Paint famously relied on the whole act rule in
order to establish the modern rule of arbitrability. In Prima Paint,143 the Court grappled with
the question of whether a court or arbitrator should determine whether a defense – such as
fraud in the inducement – applied to the entire contract, thus potentially invalidating the
contract and its arbitration clause.144 To make this determination, the Court considered
Sections 2, 3, and 4 combined. While the Court found the most on point language in holding
that the court makes an initial determination as to the “making” of arbitration agreement in
Section 4, it specifically noted that the analysis also applies to Section 3, which does not
contain the same language.145 Nearly forty years later, the Court extended this holding
explicitly to Section 2, thus making the Prima Paint holding applicable not only in federal
court but also in state court.146 Although other areas of arbitration also relied on the whole act
rule, this canon played a particularly important role in arbitrability cases.147

141

Blankley, supra note 3, at 122 (comparing the rates of reliance on the text of the FAA and prior FAA
precedent cases compared to the rates of reliance on the text in other data sets).
142
See Anaconda, 322 U.S. at 46 (reading Section 4 on compelling arbitration together with Section 8
providing specific admiralty relief); Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp., 293 U.S.
449, 453 (1935) (reading together Section 3 regarding a stay of proceedings with Section 4 regarding
compelling parties to arbitrate).
143
See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 395.
144
Id. at 396–97 (stating the question for the Court).
145
Id. at 404 (discussing how Sections 2, 3, and 4 should be read together).
146
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 447 (2006) (discussing how the Prima Paint rule
can be read into Section 2 of the FAA).
147
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 30 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). The Prima Paint case stands in stark
contrast with the Southland case, which expressly rejects the whole act rule. In dissent, Justice O’Connor urges
the application of the whole act rule, while simultaneously citing Prima Paint.
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The Supreme Court relies on canons of interpretation less often in arbitrability
majorities than non-arbitrability majorities. The most striking difference surround the use of
the arbitration canon. As noted above,148 the arbitration canon essentially states a rule of
arbitrability – that questions about arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitration.149
Arbitrability majorities only cite the arbitration canon 33% of the time, compared to 53% of
non-arbitrability majorities. No majority arbitrability opinion relied on any other substantive
canon (compared to 13% of other majority opinions) and only 6% of the arbitrability
majorities relied on language canons (compared to 19% of other majority opinions).
Turning to the purposivist tools, the majority arbitrability decisions relied on every
category of purposivist tool at a lesser rate than other majorities, although many of the
distinctions are slim. For instance, arbitrability majorities relied on legislative history only
11% of the time, but that number is nearly identical to the 13% of non-arbitrability majorities
that relied on legislative history. As noted in the Standing on its Shoulders paper, the reliance
rates on legislative history in the arbitration docket is low, even compared with other
studies.150
The arbitrability majorities relied less often on both practical consequences and
intent or purpose compared to other majority opinions. Among the categories examined in
this paper, the reliance on practical consequences is lowest among arbitrability majorities
compared to any other category of arbitration majority opinion. Both of these findings are
surprising. Arbitrability is an inherently practical question, with ramifications for parties,
courts, arbitrators, and case administration. First Options v. Kaplan recognized that the
arbitrability question “has a certain practical importance.”151 All things being equal, I would
have expected the use of these purposivist tools to be highest in the arbitrability cases
compared to preemption or even conflicts of statutes.
The Court only relied on practical consequences in arbitrability majorities 44% of
the time. Often, the type of practical consequences discussed in the arbitrability cases involve
administrative concerns. For example, the Waffle House court considered the effects of an
arbitration clause in a case in which the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission
(“EEOC”) held concurrent jurisdiction.152 The Court recognized the concern of a potential
double recovery – one in arbitration and one by the EEOC – and relied on doctrines related to
double-recovery to remedy this practical concern.153 When the arbitrability cases are also
class action cases, the majority opinions cite concerns such as efficiency and the need to
protect absent class members.154

148

See supra notes 95 and 96.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 27 UCLA L. REV. 621, 664 (1990) (“For example, the
canon favoring arbitration is now an established proceduralist policy of the Court.”).
150
See Blankley, supra note 3, at 122–24 (comparing the rates of reliance on legislative history in the FAA
cases compared to the rates of reliance on legislative history in other sets of data).
151
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 (1995).
152
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 297–98 (2002) (holding an arbitration agreement in an
employment contract is not binding on the EEOC).
153
Id. at 296–97 (reading the FAA to avoid the possibility of a double recovery).
154
See Lamps Plus Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) (discussing the many differences in administration
between class cases and bilateral cases); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 238-39 (2013)
(discussing the efficiencies present in bilateral arbitration that are likely not be present in class arbitration).
149
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The arbitrability majority opinions relied on Congressional intent or purpose at a
rate of 22%, compared to a rate of 36% of non-arbitrability majority opinions. Only three
cases relied on Congressional intent, and an additional two cases reference intent without any
analysis.155 The 1985 case of Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd156 conducts the most robust
analysis of Congressional intent within this category of cases. In Byrd, the Court declared that
the “preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce agreements” and
relied on this intent, even if the result is an inefficient “piecemeal” process involving both
arbitration and the court system.157 In contrast, cases such as Lamps Plus relied on
Congressional intent or purpose in holdings prohibiting class action arbitrations.158 In all,
however, Supreme Court majorities do not invoke the purpose of the FAA or the intent of
Congress at the time of passing consistently enough to make any generalizations or
observations in these areas.
B.

Dissenting Opinions

For the most part, the dissenting opinions in arbitrability cases show similar trends
to the non-arbitrability dissents. In two areas, the arbitrability dissents are trending towards
significance and could reach statistical significance if the pattern continues in future cases.
Those two areas involve the use of authority outside of the context of arbitration. Although
other tools are worthy of discussion, they do not show a great variance of use between
arbitrability dissents and non-arbitrability dissents.
At first glance, the use of outside authority in the arbitrability docket seems unusual
– dissent or not. Questions of arbitrability are uniquely related to arbitration, and I would have
expected this group of cases, more than other groups, to rely on the internal body of
arbitration law. The Waffle House case is an example of a dissenting opinion’s reliance on
outside statutes to help interpret the FAA. As Justice Thomas grappled with the question of
the interplay between the FAA and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), he noted that
the ADA encourages alternative dispute resolution (ADR), concluding that an employee with
an arbitration clause in a contract should be limited to that sole remedy.159 Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent in Stolt-Nielsen cited both outside statutory and case law – outside statutory law on a
procedural issue and outside case law on an issue related to class actions.160 Other cases relied
on non-FAA arbitration law or other civil procedure law, both of which make sense as they
have natural parallels to the FAA.161

155

Under my coding structure, the cases referencing, but not relying on a tool are not coded as “reliance” but
rather as “referenced or rejected.” Consider, for instance, the Prima Paint case in which the majority simply
stated that Prima Paint’s interpretation of Section 3 of the FAA was “not intended by Congress” without further
elaboration. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967).
156
See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
157
Id. at 221
158
Lamps Plus Inc., 139 S.Ct. at 1416 (noting that the FAA “envision[s]” bilateral arbitration).
159
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 313 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
160
Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 690 (2010) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing
laws regarding civil procedure); id. at 699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing cases involving class actions).
161
See, e.g., Lamps Plus Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1425 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 137
S. Ct. 1702 (2017)); Rent-a-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 79 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’n. Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)).

78
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2022/iss2/7

28

Blankley: The Future of Arbitration Law?

The Future of Arbitration Law?
Considering the textualist tools, no real trends stood out among the arbitrability
dissents. The text was relied upon somewhat consistently – 42% of arbitrability dissents,
compared to 48% of non-arbitrability dissents. Dissenting opinions relied slightly more
frequently on FAA precedent in arbitrability dissents – 50% of the time – compared to nonarbitrability dissents. Neither of these differences raised any appreciable concerns or
questions. The use of canons has a much bigger discrepancy, but the canon use was
inconsistent. For instance, arbitrability dissents relied on language canons and the arbitrability
canon 17% of the time, compared to only 3% of non-arbitrability dissents. On the other hand,
arbitrability dissents relied on other substantive canons only 8% of the time, compared to 16%
of non-arbitrability dissents. In any event, the overall instances of canon use as a whole
number was extraordinarily low (two instances for the language and arbitration canons and
one instance of using another substantive canon) that generalizations were nearly impossible
to make.
As for purposivist tools, reliance on practical consequences and purpose appeared
more frequently. Legislative history, however, was not often used; only one dissent relied on
legislative history in the arbitrability dissents. For the dissenting opinions that relied on
practical consequences, most of those were concerned about fairness, particularly in the
context of class action arbitrations.162 The consequences discussed appeared to be motived
more by the class action issue than the arbitrability issue, but in recent years, these two
concepts are often related under the question of “can this class action be arbitrated?”
Likewise, with the exception of Prima Paint, the reliance on the intent or purpose of the FAA
is inextricably entwined with the class action question.163 . In Justice Black’s dissent in Prima
Paint, he relied on a host of tools of statutory interpretation to support his argument that a
court should determine contract defenses to the entirety of contract, rather than arbitrator,
because an invalid contract cannot have a valid arbitration agreement.164 He argued that
Congress actually intended that arbitrators decide “factual controversies” in “valid contracts,”
rather than giving the arbitrator the ability in the first instance to determine the contract’s
legality.165 His opinion also relied on legislative history and other purposivist tools.166 Perhaps
the most interesting observation is that these tools have not been highly relied on since Prima
Paint, which may be due partly to Court personnel and partly to the Court treating the issue as
settled, outside of the class action context.

162

See, e.g., Lamps Plus Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1421 (Gingburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the circumstances in
this case “cries out for collective treatment”); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 252
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“In the hands of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to become . . . a
mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from
liability.”); Stolt-Nielsen SA, 559 U.S. at 699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When adjudication is costly and
individual claims are no more than modest in size, class proceedings may be ‘the thing,’ i.e., without them,
potential claimants will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.”).
163
See Lamps Plus Inc., 139 S. Ct. at 1432 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The FAA was enacted to protect against
judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements. But the Act provides no warrant . . . [to] give defendants the
best terms possible.”); see Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. at 244 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress
intended for parties to have the opportunity to vindicate statutory rights).
164
See generally Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Cocklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 407 (1967) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (describing the courts holding as “fantastic”).
165
Id. at 407–08.
166
Id. at 409–10 (discussing legislative history and the state of arbitration at the time of the FAA’s passing).
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C.

Future of the Arbitrability Docket?

If the best indicator of the future is the past, then the future of the arbitrability
docket is murky, at best. No particular factors appeared to be more persuasive in this set of
cases compared to other types of arbitration cases. In recent years, many of the arbitrability
cases implicate class action issues, so the tools that predict how class action cases are decided
(such as the overreliance on the arbitration canon, for instance) likely supersede any particular
reliance on tools related to arbitrability. To the extent that the Supreme Court pays particular
attention to the text, prior FAA precedent, and the arbitration canon compared to other types
of cases,167 advocates should continue to rely on those factors as arbitrability cases continue to
come before the Supreme Court.
V.

CONFLICTS OF FEDERAL LAW FINDINGS

The set of “conflicts of federal law” cases in this dataset are those cases in which the
question presented asks whether claims arising under federal statutes may be arbitrated at all,
particularly if the federal statute, whether it be a civil rights statute or securities law, contains
private right of action and federal court jurisdiction. This line of cases begins with Wilko v.
Swan,168 which held that actions under the Securities Act cannot be arbitrated,169 later
overruled by Rodriguez170, ushering in a series of cases, all of which holding that rights
afforded under federal law can be arbitrated.171 While these cases also deal with an element of
arbitrability, they use a distinct legal test, i.e., the “contrary congressional command” test that
asks whether Congress clearly prohibits arbitration under another federal statute.172
This subset of cases is small - ten distinct cases and twenty-five different opinions.
These cases span over fifty years, with two cases decided before 1980, three cases in the
1980s, two in the 1990s, one case in the first decade of the 2000s, and two cases in the 2010s.
These cases involved a higher number of opinions per case than the other set of arbitrability
cases. Five of the cases have three opinions, and the other five have two opinions. The
average number of opinions per case is two and a half opinions. These cases involved highly
divided voting patterns. Half of the cases (five of the ten) involved a vote of five to four, and
an additional case with a five to three majority. One case involved a six to three split, and the
two cases involved a seven to two split. Only two of these cases involved class actions.
Chart 4 shows the percentage of reliance on individual tools of statutory
interpretation, comparing the majority opinions of conflicts cases to all other majority
opinions, and the dissenting opinions of conflicts opinions compared to all other dissenting

167

Blankley, supra note 3, at 122.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
169
Id. at 438.
170
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
171
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1628 (2018) (that claims under the National Labor Relations
Act can be subject to arbitration, despite contrary rulings by the National Labor Relations Board); CompuCredit
Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 104–05 (2012) (holding that claims under the Credit repair Organization Act
can be arbitrated); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (holding that claims under
the AGE Discrimination in Employment Act can be arbitrated).
172
See, e.g., CompuCredit Corp., 565 U.S. at 98.
168
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opinions. I ran a pairwise chi square analysis between these two categories of majority
opinions and these two categories of dissenting opinions.
Only one pairwise comparison showed a significant difference. The pairwise
comparison is the reliance on legislative inaction in conflicts dissenting opinions. In all of the
arbitration dissenting opinions, the only ones relying on the tool of legislative inaction are
those in this conflicts set.
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Chart 4:
Percent Reliance on Tools of Interpretation
by Subject (Conflicts) & Opinion Type
Tool of Interpretation

A. Conflicts
Majorities

B. NonConflicts
Majorities

C. Conflicts
Dissents

D. NonConflicts
Dissents

Text

.70 AB

.90 BA

.50 CD

.45 DC

Whole Act

.30 AB

.40 BA

.00 CD

.18 DC

Other Fed Stat

.00 AB

.18 BA

.00 CD

.15 DC

FAA Precedent

.90 AB

.85 BA

.60 CD

.39 DC

Other Precedent

.40 AB

.50 BA

.30 CD

.33 DC

Subs Canon

.20 AB

.05 BA

.20 CD

.12 DC

Arb Canon

.60 AB

.43 BA

.00 CD

.09 DC

Legis Hist – All

.10 AB

.13 BA

.20 CD

.21 DC

Legis Inaction

.00 AB

.05 BA

.20 CD*

.00 DC*

Practical Conseq

.70 AB

.53 BA

.50 CD

.36 DC

Intent or Purpose

.50 AB

.43 BA

.60 CD

.43 DC

* One asterisk (*) indicates a p-value between 0.05 and 0.01 in a chi square pairwise
comparison between conflicts and non-conflicts majorities and dissents.
This section considers some notable patterns in both textualist tools and purposivist
tools used in these cases dealing with conflicts between the FAA and other federal law. This
set of data only coded the tools used to interpret the FAA and does not contain comparisons
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as to the tools of interpretation used to interpret the other federal statute at issue.173 The
following sections consider the use of text and FAA precedent, as well as substantive canon
use. In addition, this section considers the use of legislative inaction and practical
consequences.
A.

Text and FAA Precedent

Within the cases dealing with arbitrability of federal claims, the most interesting
trends across both majority opinions and dissents involve the use of FAA precedent, the
arbitration canon, and other substantive canons. In addition, the use of the text is notably
lower in these majority opinions.
Starting with the text, the majority opinion in these cases relied on the text
comparatively the lowest among any of these subgroups of arbitration cases. Cases that
considered whether federal claims are arbitrable relied on the text 70% of time, compared to
100% of the time in preemption cases (and class action cases) and 89% of the time in more
classic arbitrability cases. The reason for the lower reliance on the text in this set of cases is
puzzling. While the FAA says nothing about the arbitrability of federal claims, it equally says
nothing about preemption, class actions, or other types of arbitrability. Given the fact that this
set of cases involves highly divided opinions, reasonable minds might conclude that reliance
on the text would be higher – rather than lower – to ground controversial arbitration
decisions. That said, 70% reliance rate on the text is still high, and the only tool with a higher
percentage of reliance in majority opinions is the use of FAA precedent.
In terms of reliance on FAAA precedent, majority opinions considering the
arbitrability of federal claims considered prior precent in 90% of cases, which is similar to the
other sets of cases. As noted above,174 these rates of reliance on prior precedent is high
compared to other studies, but for the arbitration dataset, these reliance rates are consistent
across types of arbitration cases. Even dissenting opinions relied highly on prior FAA
precedent, at a rate of 60%, which is the highest rate among case type, but not alarmingly
high.
B.

Canon Use

In this set of cases, canon use has elements that are quite common and others that
are more unusual. Overall, the use of canons is somewhat higher than in other slices of the
arbitration docket. The use of the arbitration canon is consistently high for majority opinions
(60%) and consistently low in dissenting opinions (in this case, 0%). Arbitration canon use is
not particularly noteworthy in this dataset.
Other substantive canon use, however, is noteworthy, not for its frequency, but how
it is used. Two cases in this set rely on substantive canons – both in the majority opinions and
in the dissent. In Vimar Seguros, the majority opinion relied on the doctrine against implied
repeal, that “absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary,” the Court’s
role is “to regard each as effective.”175 The Court repeated the idea of giving effect to both
173
174
175

See supra note 18-20.
See supra note 21-24.
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533 (1995).
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statutes most recently in Epic Systems and reframed this concept as one that involves “respect
for the separation of powers.”176 The dissenting opinions also rely on substantive canons, but
these opinions rely on substantive canons in a different way. In the Vimar Seguros case,
Justice Stevens did not disagree that the two statutes at issue should be read harmoniously, if
possible, but he thought that a different reading of the statutes would preserve both of them
better.177 In Epic Systems, Justice Ginsburg suggested relying on a different canon – notably
the doctrine of implied repeal – to read two federal statutes together.178 Under the doctrine of
implied repeal, a later enacted statute would take precedence over a conflicting statute
enacted earlier in time.179
Some scholars questioned the Supreme Court’s choice to rely on the doctrine against
implied repeal (i.e., preserving both statutes) over the canon that would prioritize the laterenacted statute.180 The competing canons in this area serves as an example of the textualist
criticism that canon use is highly selective and has the ability to lead to outcome-oriented
results.181
C.

Purposivist Tools

Regarding the purposivist tools used in this dataset, two deserve attention. First, the
reliance on legislative inaction in dissenting opinion demonstrated a statistically significant
difference. Second, the use of practical consequences, particularly in majority opinions, show
interesting patterns.
The use of legislative inaction as a tool of statutory interpretation is one that I would
have expected to be used more often than seen in the data. This tool is essentially a
presumption that Congress is aware of and satisfied with the Court’s interpretation of a statute
if Congress not repeal or revise it.182 Presumably, the Court would rely on this doctrine more
frequently with statutes enacted decades (or even a century) ago. The FAA has existed largely
unmodified for more than 95 years, and yet this tool of interpretation is infrequently invoked.
Among dissenting opinions, the only time the doctrine of legislative inaction is
invoked is in these cases involving the arbitrability of federal statutes. All of these occasions
involved dissents by Justice Stevens. The first dissent that relied on this tool can be found in
the 1986 Rodriguez case, which overruled the 1956 decision of Wilko v. Swan.
Unsurprisingly, Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion invoked this doctrine on the basis that
176

Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1624 (2018).
Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, 515 U.S. at 555 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although I agree with the Court
that it is important to read potentially conflicting statutes so as to give effect to both wherever possible, I think
the majority has ignored a much less damaging way to harmonize COGSA with the FAA.”).
178
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1646 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing the use of implied repeal).
179
Id.
180
See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 172 (2015) (“One answer would
be to fall back again on the canons that give the edge to the more recently enacted or more specific statute.”);
see also Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will Class Action
Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 98–100 (2000) (suggesting that the Court use the familiar conflict of law
analysis to determine whether class actions must be permitted under the underlying statute).
181
See Blankley, supra note 3.
182
Coffee County Bd. of Ed. v. City of Tullahoma, 574 S.W.3d 832, 847 (Tenn. 2019) (“Under that doctrine,
legislative inaction following a contemporaneous and practical interpretation of a statute is considered
persuasive evidence of the Legislature’s intent to adopt that interpretation.”).
177
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Congress elected “not to amend” the FAA “during the ensuing 3 ½ decades” after Wilko,
lending support for his opinion that statutory claims could not be arbitrated.183 Justice Stevens
continued to express dissatisfaction with the Court’s direction as late as the 2009 in Penn
Plaza v. Pyett.184 Justice Stevens expressed a clear policy preference that Congress decide
whether claims under federal statutes are arbitrable, not courts.185
Finally, this section considers the use of practical concerns as a tool of statutory
interpretation in these cases. Among majority opinions, this tool appears to be highly
influential as it is relied on 70% of the time, compared to only 53% of non-conflicts majority
opinions. This set of cases relied on practical consequences at least 20% more compared to
the preemption cases (50% of majority preemption opinions) and arbitrability decisions (44%
of majority arbitrability cases). Many of these cases discussed the realities and competencies
of arbitrators who would handle these federal claims. For instance, in Wilko v. Swan, the
Court expressed the practical concern of whether arbitrators possessed the requisite
competency to apply federal law,186 particularly at a point in time when fewer lawyers served
as arbitrators. Over time, the Court began to recognize the ability of arbitrators to competently
handle cases involving federal claims, starting first in Mitsubishi Motors involving an
antitrust claim among businesses,187 and culminating in the Gilmer decision that goes to great
lengths to discuss the adequacy of the arbitral forum and arbitrators handling individual
cases.188 The practical concerns regarding arbitrator competency, however, become
overshadowed in cases involving class actions. In those cases, such as Epic Systems, the
primary practical concern involved business interests, such as bet-the-company cases and
undue pressure to settle.189 In these cases, the Court seemed particularly inclined to rely on
practical consequences, even if the underlying concerns change from case to case.
183
Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 486 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 268-69 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding legislative inaction persuasive in upholding the ruling of
Wilko v. Swan).
184
Pyett, 556 U.S. at 274 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185
Id. at 275 (“I dissented in those cases to express my concern that my colleagues were making policy choices
not made by Congress.”) (citations omitted).
186
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 427 (discussing the limited procedures in arbitration and the consequences for the parties
if arbitrators made a mistake in determining the law). Following Wilko, the next case in this series is the
international arbitration case of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In contrast with Wilko, the
Scherk case was particularly concerned about gamesmanship among international parties and held that
arbitration agreements should be upheld to prevent “mutually destructive jockeying” in international contracts.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 516.
187
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633-34 (1985) (“In sum, the factor
of potential complexity alone does not persuade us that an arbitral tribunal could not properly handle an
antitrust matter.”). In his dissent, Justice Stevens makes the argument that the arbitrator may not be capable of
handling complex cases, such those in antitrust. Id. at 657 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Such informality, however,
is simply unacceptable when every error may have devastating consequences for important businesses in our
national economy and may undermine their ability to compete in world markets.”). The Justices’ opinions
change over time regarding the importance of business interests as well thoughts regarding arbitrator
competency, suggesting that these cases are decided in an outcome-determinative way as opposed to a more
consistently principled approach.
188
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32 (discussing in great detail the procedural mechanisms available for the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act case at issue); Scherk, 417 U.S. at 528 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is
important that American standards of fairness in security dealings govern the destinies of American investors
until Congress changes these standards.”).
189
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S.Ct. at 1632 (considering settlement pressures in class action cases).
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Dissenting opinions relied on practical concerns half of the time (50%), which is
comparable to other types of arbitration cases. The concerns among dissenting opinions were
also widespread, but they changed over time. For instance, Justice Frankfurter’s dissenting
opinion in Wilko v. Swan suggested a lack of evidence that individual rights would be
compromised.190 When the Court reversed Wilko, the practical concerns among dissenting
justices also predictably changed – particularly implications dealing with the
employer/employee relationship grounded in fairness.191 For instance, in Epic Systems, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion relied on practical consequences such as whether the majority’s
opinion is fair to employees.192
D.

Is the FAA a Super-Statute?

The Court’s treatment of the FAA as it relates to other statutes begs the question – is
the FAA a “super-statute”? Broadly speaking, a super-statute carries extra weight, particularly
when a super-statute appears to conflict with another federal statute.193 As the Supreme Court
stated, a super-statue can displace “the normal operation of other federal laws”194 when a
question arises regarding the proper application of two or more laws. This Section concludes
that the FAA today meets the definition of a super-statute, even though Congress likely did
not consider it to be one when passed in 1925.195
Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn coined the term in 2001 to explain a
phenomenon that the Court treated some statutes with a quasi-constitutional way, while
understanding that those statutes could always be amended through the usual legislative,
administrative, or judicial processes.196 In their first article on super-statutes, Eskridge and
Ferejohn proposed three requirements for this classification. The requirements are: 1) the
statute establishes a new normative or institutional framework for a policy, 2) the statute has a
lasting effect on public culture, and 3) the statute has a broad effect on the law, beyond the

190

Wilko, 346 U.S. at 439 (“There is nothing in the record before us, nor in the facts of which we can take
judicial notice, to indicate that the arbitral system . . . would not afford the plaintiff the rights to which he is
entitled.”)
191
See Gilmer 500 U.S. at 42-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns about the balance of power
between employer and employee).
192
Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S.Ct. at 1647 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority option will
disincentivize workers from bringing legitimate claims).
193
See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, Ga., 140 S.Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (“Because [the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA)] operates as a kind of super statute, displacing the normal operation of other federal
laws, it might supersede Title VII’s commands in appropriate cases.”); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 673 (7th
Cir. 2013) (describing RFRA as a super-statute and giving it more weight than other statutes).
194
Bostock, 140 S.Ct. at 1754.
195
Other courts and commentators also conclude that the FAA is a super-statute, although no scholar has done
a complete analysis of the FAA’s status as such. See Capua v. Air Europa Lineas Aereas S.A. Inc., 2021 WL
965500, *8 (S.D. Fla.) (holding that the FAA should apply even if there is an arguably contrary regulation
promulgated by the department of Transportation); Carmen Comsti, A Metamorphosis: How Forced
Arbitration Arrived in the Workplace, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 5, 10 (2014) (“Courts have construed
the FAA Beyond its original statutory reach, elevating the law to the status of a ‘super-statute.’”).
196
William N. Eskridge Jr. & John A. Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216–17 (2001)
(describing the quasi-constitutional status of super-statutes). Some examples of super-statutes include the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, and the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 1227.
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language of the statute.197 While super-statutes generally “trump” other law, their application
is not absolute, particularly when they clash with other super-statutes or with the
Constitution.198
Under their theory, super-statutes must be embraced by the public at the time it is
considered a super-statute, even if the statue was not originally celebrated or embraced.199 As
a matter of statutory interpretation, the authors contend that super-statutes should be
construed liberally with an eye to the purposes of Congress, but perhaps not with a rigid
adherence to some of the original expectations given the importance super-statues evolution
over time.200
Eskridge and Ferejohn considered super-statutes as akin to constitutional change,
but with a small “c.”201 Entrenchment of a statute into American life or culture is an essential
element of super-statutes.202 In the usual case, entrenchment is lengthy process driven by
legislative and administrative processes, as opposed to the judicial process.203 For example,
the authors consider the Social Security Act to be a super-statute that was ill received by
public at first, but later became a large part of American life.204 Other scholars have adopted
the “super-statute” language to describe statutes that appear to have more weight, heft, and
staying power than a typical statute.205
197

Id. at 1216–17 (describing the requirements of a super-statute).
Id. at 1216 (“Because super-statutes exhibit this kind of normative gravity, they have sufficient attraction to
bend and reshape the surrounding landscape. Super-statutes do not always trump other sources of law,
however, in party because they may clash not only with the Constitution but also with other super-statutes.”).
199
Id. at 1230–31 (discussing this requirement as it relates to the act that created the Bank of the United
States).
200
Id. at 1247.
201
WILLIAM ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 12 (2010). In their book, Eskridge, Jr. and Ferejohn argue that that small “c” constitutional
change is where most constitutional change occurs. Super-statutes may provide the way to provide both lasting
effect while maintaining the ability evolve over time. Id. at 122.
202
See id. at 111.
203
See id. at 165 (discussing entrenchment). Some scholars reject the idea that entrenchment is necessary for a
statute to have super-statute status. See Sam Simon, How Statutes Create Rights: The Case of the National
Labor Relations Act, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1503 (2013) (arguing that the National Labor Relations Act should
be interpreted in the manner of a super-statute, even if it does not contain some of the hallmarks of the
designation).
204
See id. at 186 (discussing the Social Security Act). Conversely, statutes can lose their status as superstatutes if public sentiment and support underpinning the statute dissipate over time. Id. at 122 (discussing
deentrenchment). When agencies implement super-statutes, those interpretations are also subject to deference.
See id. at 264–65 (considering the intersection of super-statutes and Chevon deference). Conversely, at least
one scholar argues that a super-statute could be interpreted against the enforcing agency if the agency does not
consider the people the law was intended to serve. See Twinette L. Johnson, In the Room Where It Happens:
Including the “Public’s Will” in Judicial Review of Agency Action, 72 ARK. L. REV. 467 (2019) (arguing that
because the Higher Education Act is a super-statute, it should be interpreted in light of normative values, even
if the Department of Education acts contrary to those values); Twinette L. Johnson, 50,000 Voices Can’t Be
Wrong, but Courts Might Be: How Chevron’s Existence Contributes to Retrenching the Higher Education Act,
103 KY. L.J. 605 (2015).
205
See, e.g., Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207
(2015) (considering the Administrative Procedure Act a super-statute but questioning whether the APA should
be given such broad deference by the Supreme Court); Garrick B. Pursley, Defeasible Federalism, 63 ALA. L.
REV. 801 (2012); Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62 AM. J. COMP. L.
641 (2014).
198
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Although likely not intended to become a super-statute at the time, the FAA meets
the Eskridge and Ferejohn three-part test. Under the first part, the FAA has undeniably altered
“then-existing regulatory baselines.”206 Congress passed the FAA to reverse “judicial
hostility” towards arbitration agreements and to make agreement to arbitrate enforceable
under the theory of specific enforcement.207 Although the legislative history suggests that
Congress intended the FAA to apply to business disputes,208 the post-enactment interpretation
by the Court in extending the FAA to statutory claims,209 claiming involving consumers,210
and class action claims211 all demonstrate that the FAA established a new norm for the
resolution of private disputes.
Under the second part of the test, the FAA could be described as creating a new
normative or institutional framework for arbitration. While many super-statutes have broad
regulatory schemes interpreting them,212 the FAA managed to create a new framework
through a short and simple statute.213 The FAA, however, is not the only procedural superstatute without an administrative scheme. Similar arguments have been made about the status
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),214 which is more robust than the FAA but also
focused on procedure, rather than substantive rights.
The third prong of test considers whether the statute has a lasting effect on society.
In their first paper on super-statutes, Eskridge and Ferejohn described the impact of civil
rights and environmental statutes over time, focused on the impact the statutes have at the
time of interpretation – not the time of enactment.215 While the FAA has had lasting impact on
society, particularly the creation of new norms of private dispute resolution,216 the effects of
206

Eskridge Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 196, at 1230.
Kristen M. Blankley, Impact Preemption: A New Theory of Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 711, 719 (2015).
208
Id. at 726–27 (describing legislative history, particularly the business interests who lobbied Congress for its
passing).
209
See, e.g., Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (applying the FAA to individual
investor claims under the Securities Act); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)
(applying the FAA to individual investor claims under the Securities Act).
210
See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) (applying the FAA to cases
involving predatory lending in the check-cashing industry); CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95
(2012) (applying the FAA to cases involving the credit repair industry).
211
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (finding that the arbitrator
improperly certified a class); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that California
law invalidating class action waivers was preempted).
212
See supra notes 194–95 (describing examples of super-statutes, most of which have broad regulatory
schemes).
213
The FAA only has sixteen provisions, most of which are short. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
214
See Kovacs, supra note 205 (discussing the status of the APA as a super-statute).
215
See Eskridge Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 196, at 1237–46 (describing the broad support for the general
notions underlying these statutes).
216
See, e.g., Jane Flanagan & Terri Gerstein, “Sign on the Dotted Line”: How Coercive Employment Contracts
are Bringing Back the Lochner Era and What We Can Do About It, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 441, 443 (2020)
(“Coercive contracts have also threatened workers’ abilities to exercise voice, most obviously through
mandatory arbitration and class/collective action waivers, but also through broad confidentiality and nondisparagement clauses that may chill workers from discussing the terms and conditions of work with their
colleagues.”); Ashley M. Sergeant, The Corporation’s New Lethal Weapon: Mandatory Binding Arbitration
Clauses, 57 S.D. L. REV. 149, 157 (2015) (“Corporations quickly began to recognize arbitration as an
alternative to litigation and began using this procedure to settle many employment disputes.”); Carmen Comsti,
207
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these norms are politically polarizing.217 While most individuals can agree on the basic
principles of concepts such as antidiscrimination and conservation, whether the same can be
said about the benefits of arbitration is significantly less likely. While arbitration has become
an entrenched concept among the business community, it does not carry the same popularity
among the general public. However, given its prevalence in modern contract drafting, this
prong could be considered satisfied.
The FAA is also interpreted in the same way as a super-statute. Super-statutes are
often interpreted with purposivist tools of interpretation.218 Eskridge and Ferejohn observed
that super-statutes are read purposivistly even by Justices who commonly apply originalist
tools.219 In addition, the Court relies on deferential canons to give broad interpretation to
super-statutes.220 As noted in my previous research, these patterns are evident in interpretation
of the FAA. The most prevalent tools of interpreting the FAA include the statutory text, prior
FAA precedent (building on itself), and self-serving arbitration canons.221 My research also
uncovered the prevalence of purposivist tools such as the intent of the FAA and its practical
consequences, even when interpreted by conservative justices.222
Super-statutes have a “gravitational” pull on other law.223 In every case in which the
Supreme Court considered a potential conflict between the FAA and another statute, the FAA
prevailed, with the Court claiming that the statutes could be read together.224 The Court has
sided with the FAA even when it collides with other super-statutes. This trend includes the
fact that the Supreme Court has found disputes arbitrable that fall under the Sherman
Antitrust Act,225 the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,226 and the National Labor
Relations Act..227 In 2001, Eskridge and Ferejohn noted the FAA’s super-statute status

A Metamorphosis: How Forced Arbitration Arrived in the Workplace, 35 BERK. J. OF LAB. & EMP. L. 5, 6
(2014) (“Over the past twenty years, there has been movement away from the public enforcement of statutory
workplace rights in favor of a private system of forced arbitration of employment disputes.”).
217
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as a political matter); F. Paul Bland, et al., From the Frontlines of the Modern Movement to End Forced
Arbitration and Restore Jury Rights, 95 CHI. KENT L. REV. 585, 586 (2020) (“Over the past decade, battles
over the legality of forced arbitration have been waged all across the nation in courtrooms, legislative
chambers, and boardrooms, pitting two sets of combatants against one another.”).
218
Eskridge Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 196, at 1234 (a “super-statute will generally be applied in a purposive
rather than simple text-bounded or originalist way”).
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Id. (noting that the Burger and Rehnquist Courts interpreted Sherman Antitrust Act in a purposive way,
despite the Courts’ general trend of emphasizing plain meaning).
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Id. at 1249–52 (describing canon use with a super-statute).
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See Blankley, supra note 3.
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Eskridge Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 196, at 1236.
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Blankley, supra note 3.
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Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1985) (holding that the
claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act were subject to arbitration).
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Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991) (“We conclude that Gilmer has not met his
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Act.”)
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beginning with the Mitsubishi case,228 and subsequent Supreme Court cases solidify this
conclusion.
Given this framework, the Court has certainly treated the FAA as a super-statute. It
relied on the same interpretive tools as it used with other super-statutes. The creation of the
arbitration canon buttressed the conclusion that the Court treated the FAA as a super-statute.
The FAA’s prevalence over other substantive law further supports this conclusion.
At least three facts suggest that the FAA should not be considered a super-statute,
despite its treatment. First, the turning point for the FAA arrived in the mid-1980s, sixty years
after its passage, and Congress likely intended the FAA to be ordinary. Second, the lack of a
large regulatory scheme supporting the statute cuts against its status. Third, while entrenched
in the business community, arbitration is not particularly well known or popular among the
general public. Criticism aside, characterizing the FAA as a super-statute helps explain the
Court’s treatment of the FAA, particularly when it potentially conflicts with other federal law.
E.

The Future of the Conflicts of Federal Law Docket?

The future of the arbitrability of federal claims is difficult to predict from tools of
statutory interpretation, in part because of the low number of cases within this dataset.
Judging by outcomes is certainly an easier task than judging by statutory tool. Since
overturning Wilko v. Swan, the Court has never found a “contrary congressional command”
that would prevent arbitration of claims falling under it.229 In other words, unless Congress
makes explicit a desire that claims under a federal statute not be arbitrated, the Court is highly
likely to allow those claims to be arbitrated while citing the substantive canon favoring the
reading of statutes harmoniously.230 In this way, the FAA operates as a super-statute having
an overweighted effect on other statues working in the same area as arbitration.
As for tools of interpretation, the Court’s reliance on practical circumstances in this
set of cases is noteworthy and one that may continue to be persuasive. Although the
controlling practical considerations change over time, the Court invokes them time and time
again. Practical considerations may be particularly important in this area given the fact that
these cases involve two federal statutes, both of which may have competing interests and
disparate impacts on parties, including employers, employees, consumers, and businesses. To
the extent that these cases also involve class action issues (admittedly less frequently than
other arbitration cases), the justices will also take into account the realities surrounding
whether those cases proceed as a class or individually.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article provides an in-depth analysis of the statutory tools of interpretation
used by the Supreme Court as it interprets the FAA in different lines of arbitration cases. By
breaking down the arbitration docket into the categories of class action cases, preemption

228

Eskridge Jr. & Ferejohn, supra note 196, at 1262–63 (discussing Mitsubishi and the FAA’s status as a
super-statute).
229
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98 (2012) (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226).
230
See supra notes 175-77.
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cases, arbitrability cases, and conflicts of federal law cases, new patterns begin to emerge,
even if the data sets are too small to detect much statistical significance.
If the past is a predictor of the present, some trends are worth following. First, the
class action cases will likely continue to build off of themselves, by relying on past precedent
and the arbitration canon, creating a jurisprudence based, theoretically, on the text of the
FAA, but a text that does not mention class actions at all. Second, the Court will likely
continue to give the FAA broad preemptive power given not only its support across the Court
but also because of the “Thomas Effect” preserving this power if necessary. Third, the
arbitrability cases stand as a microcosm of the entire arbitration docket, even though they do
not contain any strong trends. Finally, this paper begins a decision on whether the FAA is, or
more importantly should be, a super-statute. Although the FAA appears to meet the definition
of a super-statute in both interpretation and effect, future research should continue to answer
questions about whether this treatment is justified.
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